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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted section 1983 in the aftermath of the Civil War
to provide a cause of action for individuals deprived of their constitutional rights by officials acting under the color of state law.1 This
† B.A., Middlebury College, 2006; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2015; Senior
Articles Editor, Cornell Law Review.
1
See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 1–2 (2d
ed. 2008), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sec19832.pdf/$file/sec
19832.pdf. The predecessor of section 1983 was enacted as section 1 of the “Ku Klux Klan
Act.” Id. at 1. The statute “grew out of a message sent to Congress by President Grant on
March 23, 1871,” in which President Grant alluded to the “condition of affairs now exist[ing] in some States of the Union rendering life and property insecure.” Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). Concerned with abuses of Civil Rights by officials acting
under the color of state law, President Grant urged “such legislation as in the judgment of
Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in
all parts of the United States.” Id. at 173.
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landmark Civil Rights statute is intended to hold public officials accountable through civil liability for wrongs committed in their official
capacities.2 Indeed, its very purpose is to strike at prejudiced, intolerant, or neglectful public officials.3 It might seem odd, then, that although the literal language of section 1983 does not mention any
immunities for public officials, the Supreme Court has implicitly read
into the statute the very immunities that protected these officials from
civil liability at common law.4
This Note does not intend to debate the merits of more than sixty
years of firmly established jurisprudence regarding the implicit immunities in section 1983.5 It does, however, argue that lower courts have
misinterpreted a key element of the Supreme Court’s section 1983
immunity framework and helped set the stage for unwarranted expansions of absolute immunity to officials who did not have (or would not
have had) absolute immunity at common law.
Some lower courts subscribe to a theory that immunity can transfer from an official entitled to absolute immunity to auxiliary officials
who assist the immune official in the performance of the immune official’s functions, even when the auxiliary official is performing a different function than the immune official.6 By conceptualizing the
auxiliary official as an arm of the immune official, these courts hold
that it is sufficient that the auxiliary official’s function is integrally related to the judicial process for that auxiliary official to receive absolute immunity.7
2
See Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Is Born: The Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of
Tenney and Monroe, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2013). In its current form,
section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2013).
3
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180 (“It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was
passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of
citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.”).
4
Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion of Absolute
Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil Rights Cases, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 265, 270 (2006)
(“[S]ince the entire goal of the statute was to impose liability on state officials who violated
constitutional rights, it seems doubtful that Congress intended to insulate officials who
violate civil rights by granting them immunity.”).
5
See discussion infra Part I.
6
See discussion infra Part II.A.
7
See, e.g., Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that immunity
extends to individuals performing functions closely related to the judicial process).
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The notion that immunity can transfer from one official to another official performing a different function, however, is an analytic
mistake that misconstrues the Supreme Court’s “functional approach”8 to section 1983 immunities. A theory of transferred immunity disregards the need to root any extension of absolute immunity in
the common law as it existed in 1871, when section 1983 was first enacted.9 Instead, by subscribing to a theory that immunity can transfer
from an immune official to an auxiliary official performing a different
function, courts are making impermissible policy decisions about the
importance of protecting certain officials.10
As a result, courts that engage in transferred-immunity-reasoning
risk extending absolute immunity in section 1983 cases to new officials
and new functions that were never intended to be free from section
1983 liability. More importantly, by expanding the scope of immune
functions, courts potentially deprive section 1983 litigants of an important civil remedy for injuries suffered as a result of official
misconduct.
While some scholars have critiqued the expansion of absolute immunity in the context of section 1983,11 this Note does not intend to
merely recap those critiques. Rather, its purpose is to identify the analytical error that many courts make when applying the Supreme
Court’s section 1983 immunity framework. Part I examines and de8
See id. (“Under [the functional approach], a court looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
9
See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring)
(“Common-law tort rules can provide a ‘starting point for the inquiry under § 1983 . . . .’”
(quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978))); see also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158,
170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]mmunity doctrine is rooted in historical analogy, based on the existence of common-law rules in 1871, rather than in freewheeling
policy choice[s].” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10
It is important to look to the 1871 common law in understanding whether immunities apply in the context of section 1983 because the Court adopted immunities in section
1983 by means of statutory interpretation. Thus, the Court’s fundamental rationale for
implying immunities in section 1983 is that the 42d Congress would not have eliminated
well-established immunities without explicitly doing so. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554–55 (1967) (“The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant
to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities. . . . The immunity of judges for acts
within the judicial role is . . . well established, and we presume that Congress would have
specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.”); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (noting that Congress would not have eliminated legislative immunity
without doing so explicitly).
11
Some scholars have noted and criticized the expansions of absolute immunity from
section 1983 liability in the lower courts. See, e.g., Johns, supra note 4, at 276 (“[T]he lower
courts have failed to follow the Supreme Court’s decisions limiting the application of the
[absolute judicial immunity] doctrine to the historical boundaries of absolute judicial immunity in 1871, the sole basis for its application in § 1983 actions.”). These critics, however, have not addressed how or why the lower courts have come to mistakenly apply
section 1983 immunities.
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scribes the Supreme Court’s section 1983 immunity framework. Part
II identifies the misapplication of absolute immunity in section 1983
cases in a number of circuit court decisions that subscribe to a theory
of transferred immunity. Part III briefly addresses the reason why
some courts have mistakenly applied the Supreme Court’s section
1983 immunity framework.
I
THE SECTION 1983 IMMUNITIES FRAMEWORK
When the 42d Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it created a new federal tort to “provide[ ] a damages remedy against state and local government officials
and local governments for violations of constitutional rights.”12 Section 1983’s cause of action is at the same time both broader than torts
recognized at common law, in that it makes government officials liable for violations of constitutional rights, and narrower, in that it applies only to government officials acting under the color of law.13
Despite the fact that section 1983’s literal language does not mention any immunities,14 the Supreme Court has instructed that the 42d
Congress drafted section 1983 against the backdrop of the common
law as it stood in 1871.15 This common law backdrop includes certain
firmly established immunities for government officials,16 which “were
so fundamental and widely understood at the time § 1983 was enacted
that the 42d Congress could not be presumed to have abrogated them
silently.”17 Two levels of immunity are available to public officials:
qualified and absolute. Qualified immunity protects public officials
when the official reasonably believes his actions are legal.18 The reasonableness of the official’s actions is judged objectively.19 The corollary to this principle is that “[a]n official who violated clearly
established federal law did not act in an objectively reasonable manner” and thus, faces liability.20 In contrast, absolute immunity “applies
12

Nahmod, supra note 2, at 1020.
See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1504–05 (2012).
14
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2013).
15
Erwin Chemerinsky, Absolute Immunity: General Principles and Recent Developments, 24
TOURO L. REV. 473, 474 (2008).
16
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967). The Court reasoned that certain
immunities, such as judicial and legislative immunity, were so well established at common
law that Congress would not have abolished those immunities in enacting section 1983
without making their intention to do so explicit. Id.; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 211 (2013) (“The Court explains [judicial
immunity] in the familiar terms of a historical pedigree so well established that Congress
must have meant to maintain it.”); Nahmod, supra note 2, at 1032–36.
17
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring)
18
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009).
19
SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 1, at 143.
20
Id.
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even when the [official] is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.”21 Both types of immunity cut off the litigation before it
begins.22
The Court looks at the legal landscape at the time of section
1983’s enactment to determine the intent of the 42d Congress in regard to retaining common law immunities in section 1983. In doing
so, the Court engages in statutory interpretation. As a result, even if
there exists a common law tradition of immunizing a function, if providing immunity to that function does not accord with the history and
purpose of section 1983, then the Court will “refus[e] to allow common-law analogies to displace statutory analysis, [and] declin[e] to import even well-settled common-law rules.”23
In summary, although section 1983’s language does not reference any immunities,24 the Court has interpreted the statute to include immunities that were firmly established in the common law as of
1871, so long as those immunities do not conflict with the purpose of
section 1983.25 Courts are not empowered to extend immunity based
on their view of sound policy because doing so is inconsistent with the
role of statutory interpretation in section 1983 immunities law.26
Thus, when evaluating a claim of immunity in a section 1983 case,
courts must look first to the immunities historically afforded to officials; if the function for which the official is claiming immunity has a
historical justification, the court must then consider whether section
1983’s purpose accords with the policy for immunizing the function.27
A. Categories of Absolute Immunity in the Section 1983 Context
The Supreme Court has so far identified three categories of absolute immunity that were implicitly adopted into section 1983 when it
was enacted in 187128: (1) legislative immunity, (2) judicial immunity,
21

Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
Id.
23
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); see also Burns
v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 497 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“While we have not thought a common-law tradition (as of 1871) to be a sufficient condition for absolute immunity under § 1983, we have thought it to be a necessary one . . . .”
(internal citation omitted)).
24
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2013).
25
See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163–64 (1992) (“[I]rrespective of the common law
support, we will not recognize an immunity available at common law if § 1983’s history or
purpose counsel against applying it in § 1983 actions.”).
26
Burns, 500 U.S. at 493 (“[W]e look to the common law and other history for guidance because our role is not to make a freewheeling policy choice, but rather to discern
Congress’[s] likely intent in enacting § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
27
See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503–05 (2012).
28
Commentators have criticized the Supreme Court’s reading of the common law of
judicial and prosecutorial immunity. According to Margaret Johns, “to the extent that
there is a legislative history on the point, it suggests that Congress intended to impose
22
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and (3) quasi-judicial immunity.29 Legislative immunity encompasses
the function of legislative decisionmaking.30 Judicial immunity encompasses the “function of resolving disputes between parties, or of
authoritatively adjudicating private rights” within an official’s subject-matter jurisdiction.31 And quasi-judicial immunity encompasses
the functions of advocacy (e.g., prosecutorial immunity), testimony
(e.g., witness immunity), and factual adjudication (e.g., juror immunity) during the judicial phase of a proceeding.32
1. Legislative Immunity
The Court first considered section 1983’s implied immunities in
Tenney v. Brandhove.33 A committee of the California Legislature summoned William Brandhove, an admitted Communist, allegedly to intimidate him from exercising his First Amendment rights.34 Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the Tenney majority, held that Brandhove
failed to state a cause of action under section 1983 because the legislative committee members were protected by absolute legislative immunity for acts, such as legislative investigations, which are “an
established part of representative government.”35
liability on judges under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.” Johns, supra note 4, at 270 n.30
(citing Joseph Romagnoli, What Constitutes a Judicial Act for Purposes of Judicial Immunity?, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 1503, 1503 (1985)). Similarly, critics have attacked prosecutorial immunity for not being firmly grounded in the common law as of 1871. See Burns, 500 U.S. at
505 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that in recognizing
absolute immunity for prosecutors “[the Court] relied . . . upon a common-law tradition of
prosecutorial immunity that developed much later than 1871, and was not even a logical
extrapolation from then-established immunities”).
29
See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
30
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); see also Chemerinsky, supra note
15, at 475.
31
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 434 n.8 (1993) (quoting Burns,
500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
32
This Note classifies the immunity extended to witnesses, prosecutors, and jurors
under the heading of quasi-judicial immunity. The term quasi-judicial, however, has been
used in varied ways by different authorities. For example, a quasi-judicial official has been
defined as an official who exercises adjudicatory acts outside of the courtroom similar to
those exercised by a judge in court. FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC
OFFICES AND OFFICERS 420 (Callaghan and Company 1890); see, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (describing the function of an agency adjudicator as quasi-judicial).
This note, however, uses quasi-judicial in the same sense that Justice Scalia used the term
in Burns when he defined quasi-judicial as “official acts involving policy discretion but not
consisting of adjudication.” 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). It should be noted that Justice Scalia goes on to claim that at common law,
quasi-judicial acts were only afforded qualified immunity. Id. While it is not my purpose to
test the common-law history relied upon by Justice Scalia, I do challenge the idea that a
prosecutor’s advocacy function received only qualified immunity. See discussion infra notes
73–81.
33
341 U.S. 367 (1951).
34
Nahmod, supra note 2, at 1026.
35
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377.
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Justice Frankfurter grounded his decision in the long-established
common law precedent that legislators are immune when performing
legislative functions.36 He cited the Sixteenth Century English Parliamentary debates that culminated in the 1689 English Bill of Rights
that “declared in unequivocal language: ‘That the Freedom of
Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.’ ”37
Justice Frankfurter then traced the American adoption of legislative
immunity that culminated with the inclusion of the Speech or Debate
Clause in the Constitution.38
In regard to whether absolute legislative immunity accorded with
the purpose of section 1983, Justice Frankfurter quoted James Wilson,
a drafter of the Speech or Debate Clause:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and
that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion
offence.39

Thus, absolute legislative immunity protects the public by affording its
representatives the freedom to engage in spirited and unhesitating debates in carrying out their legislative duties without being inhibited by
the potential of being targets of private litigation.
2. Judicial Immunity
Sixteen years after Tenney, the Supreme Court recognized an additional common law absolute immunity lurking behind the literal
language of section 1983. In Pierson v. Ray, the Court held that judges
acting within their judicial role have absolute immunity from section
1983 liability.40 Judge Spencer, a municipal police justice, sentenced
Civil Rights advocates to four months in prison for violating a
Mississippi state law that made congregating in public spaces illegal
under certain circumstances.41 The convictions were overturned on
appeal and the advocates brought a section 1983 suit against Judge
36
Id. at 372–77 (demonstrating the tradition protecting legislative immunity in England after its Civil War and preservation of that tradition “in the formation of State and
National Governments” in the United States).
37
Id.
38
Id. (“Freedom of speech and action in the legislature was taken as a matter of
course by those who severed the Colonies from the Crown and founded our Nation. It was
deemed so essential for representatives of the people that it was written into the Articles of
Confederation and later into the Constitution.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
39
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373 (quoting II THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (Andrews ed.,
Callaghan and Company, 1896)).
40
386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967).
41
Id. at 549.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-4\CRN406.txt

992

unknown

Seq: 8

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

27-APR-15

12:53

[Vol. 100:985

Spencer.42 The Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the
claim against Judge Spencer on the grounds that he was protected by
absolute judicial immunity for acts done while performing his judicial
functions.43 Chief Justice Warren wrote, “[f]ew doctrines were more
solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from
liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction.”44
Although some commentators dispute just how firmly judicial immunity was entrenched in the common law,45 the Court’s recognition
of judicial immunity was rooted in English precedent dating back to
the 1607 case of Floyd & Barker.46 Lord Edward Coke reasoned that
the King’s judicial officers derived their immunity from the sovereign
authority of the Crown.47 Because the King was immune, those responsible for carrying out his will were likewise immune.48 Despite its
foundation in monarchy, judicial absolute immunity persisted in the
common law that developed in the United States.49 The King’s sovereign authority was replaced by the sovereign authority of, first, state
constitutions and, later, Article III.50
The Pierson Court also held that absolute judicial immunity accorded with the purpose of section 1983.51 Absolute judicial
42

Id. at 549–50.
Id. at 553–54.
44
Id. Chief Justice Warren noted that the Supreme Court adopted judicial immunity
in 1872 in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872). Id. at 554. Bradley involved a dispute
that arose from the trial of John Suratt for the murder of President Lincoln. Bradley, 80
U.S. at 336. After a heated dispute between Judge Fisher of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia (the criminal court in the District) and Bradley, a lawyer for Suratt,
Judge Fisher barred Bradley’s continued participation in the trial. Id. at 337. Bradley
brought suit against Judge Fisher alleging that he acted maliciously to deprive Bradley of
his right to practice as an attorney before the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Id. at 337–38. The Supreme Court adopted the common-law tradition that judges are immune for actions within their judicial authority regardless of their motives, noting “[t]he
purity of [a judge’s] motives cannot in this way be the subject of judicial inquiry.” Id. at
347.
45
See Johns, supra note 4, at 270 n.30 (“[I]t is not at all clear that the common law
granted judges absolute immunity in 1871. . . . Nor is it clear that Congress intended to
insulate judges from civil-rights liability. Indeed, to the extent that there is legislative history on the point, it suggests that Congress intended to impose liability on judges under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.” (citing Romagnoli, supra note 28, at 1503)).
46
77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1607).
47
Id. at 1307. In Floyd & Barker Lord Coke reasoned that “the King himself is de jure
to deliver justice to all his subjects; and for this, that he himself cannot do it to all persons,
he delegates his power to his Judges, who have the custody and guard of the King’s oath.”
Id.
48
See id.
49
See Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1101–02 (3d Cir. 1973).
50
See id. at 1102 (“The King’s prerogative, formerly exercised by the Chancery Court,
is by virtue of article III, a part of the judicial power of the United States, and is exercised
by each of the federal courts within the respective jurisdictions conferred by Congress.”).
51
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967).
43

R
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immunity “is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that
the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.”52 Rather than subject a
judge to section 1983 liability, the judge’s “errors may be corrected on
appeal.”53 Thus, absolute judicial immunity does not undermine the
purpose of section 1983 because absolute judicial immunity preserves
an independent judiciary and potential plaintiffs have adequate access
to appeal to correct erroneous decisions.54
3. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
A third category of implicit section 1983 immunity based on a
common law tradition is quasi-judicial immunity. In 1772, Lord
Mansfield explained an oft-cited common law rule that “neither party,
witness, counsel, jury, or Judge, can be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for words spoken in office.”55 Thus, in addition to judicial immunity, there is an established common law tradition of absolute
immunity for witnesses, counsel, and members of the jury.56 This category of absolute immunity however, is not a blanket common law
basis for extending absolute immunity to every individual who plays
some role in a judicial proceeding.57 Rather, the functions protected
by absolute quasi-judicial immunity for participation in the judicial
process are limited to testimony, advocacy, and factual adjudication.58
Witness immunity is an example of absolute quasi-judicial immunity afforded to officials engaged in the judicial process. In Briscoe v.
LaHue, a convicted burglar alleged that a police officer delivered perjured testimony at trial regarding the value of fingerprints found at
52

Id. at 554 (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, (1868) L.R. 3 Exch. 220 at 223).
Id.
54
The argument that absolute judicial immunity conforms with the purpose of section 1983 is not without criticism. In his dissent in Pierson, Justice Douglas noted that the
predecessor of section 1983, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was drafted in the context of
“[a] condition of lawlessness exist[ing] in certain of the States, under which people were
being denied their civil rights. Congress intended to provide a remedy for the wrongs
being perpetrated.” Id. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas pointed out that Congress “recognized that certain members of the judiciary were instruments of oppression
and were partially responsible for the wrongs to be remedied.” Id. at 563 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). From this point of view, cloaking the very officials at whom the law was aimed
with absolute immunity is antithetical to the very purpose of section 1983.
55
The King v. Skinner, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 529 (K.B.) 530.
56
See id.
57
See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 286–87 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Absolute immunity
does not extend to all positions simply ‘because they are part of the judicial function.’”
(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 435 (1976))). But see Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.
478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that no
quasi-judicial act deserves absolute immunity but that quasi-judicial functions were entitled
to only qualified immunity at common law).
58
See infra notes 59–80 and accompanying text.
53
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the crime scene.59 In recognizing absolute witness immunity from
section 1983 suits for police officers, the Court first noted “[t]he immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent damages liability for
their testimony in judicial proceedings was well established in English
common law”60 and American courts generally followed the English
rule.61 As such, the Court concluded that “the common law’s protection for [private] witnesses is ‘a tradition so well grounded in history
and reason’ that we cannot believe that Congress impinged on it ‘by
covert inclusion in the general language [of section 1983].’ ”62 In extending the common law witness immunity available to private individuals to public officials, the Court explained that no reasonable
distinction exists between public and private witnesses.63
The Briscoe Court’s recognition of section 1983 common law witness immunity was preceded by the Court’s recognition of common
law absolute immunity for public prosecutors in Imbler v. Pachtman.64
After spending more than five years in prison for murder before being
released on a habeas corpus petition, Imbler, the plaintiff, initiated a
section 1983 suit against Pachtman, the prosecutor, for knowingly allowing a witness to give false testimony during Imbler’s murder trial,
thus depriving Imbler of his constitutional right to a fair trial.65
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, held that prosecutors are
59
460 U.S. 325, 326–27 (1983). Along with Briscoe’s claims against Officer LaHue,
the Court also considered the claims of two convicted sexual assault offenders who brought
a section 1983 suit against a police officer for depriving these individuals of their constitutionally protected right to a fair trial by giving false testimony at trial. Id.
60
Id. at 330–31 (citing Cutler v. Dixon, (1585) 76 Eng. Rep. 886 (Q.B.); Anfield v.
Feverhill, (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 1113 (K.B.); Henderson v. Broomhead, (1859) 157 Eng.
Rep. 964 (Ex.) 968).
61
Id. (citing cases). Some American courts, however, required that defendants claiming witness immunity must show that their “allegedly defamatory statements were relevant
to the judicial proceeding” in order to claim the privilege. Id. at 331.
62
Id. at 334 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)).
63
Id. at 335–36 (“[The police officer] may reasonably be viewed as acting like any
other witness sworn to tell the truth.”). In Rehberg v. Paulk, the Supreme Court recently
extended absolute witness immunity to public officials who testify before a grand jury. 132
S. Ct. 1497, 1500 (2012).
64
424 U.S. 409 (1976). As I will discuss below, the Court’s reasoning in Imbler failed
to acknowledge a pre-1871 common-law tradition to support its recognition of absolute
prosecutorial immunity, which has resulted in confusion among lower courts about how to
apply the Court’s section 1983 immunity precedent.
65
Imbler was convicted of murder and sentenced to death at trial. After the trial,
however, Pachtman “wrote to the Governor of California describing evidence turned up
after trial by himself and an investigator” that suggested that one of the key witnesses,
Costello, “was less trustworthy than he had represented originally.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 412.
Based in part on Pachtman’s letter, Imbler filed a habeas corpus petition. Id. at 413. During the habeas hearing, Costello recanted his testimony from the trial. Id. Although the
California Supreme Court denied Imbler’s habeas petition because it felt that Costello’s
testimony was not dispositive in the jury’s verdict, several years later Imbler filed a habeas
petition in federal court on the same grounds. Id. at 413–14. Finding eight instances of
state misconduct at Imbler’s trial, six of which were related to Costello’s testimony, the

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-4\CRN406.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 11

27-APR-15

THE TRANSFERRED IMMUNITY TRAP

12:53

995

entitled to absolute immunity in section 1983 suits for their alleged
misconduct during the judicial phase of a prosecution.66
Justice Powell explained that “earlier decisions on § 1983 immunities were not products of judicial fiat . . . . Rather, each was predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically
accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind
it.”67 Justice Powell then traced the development of prosecutorial immunity in the American common law, starting with the 1896 Indiana
case of Griffith v. Slinkard,68 and culminating with the Supreme
Court’s adoption of absolute prosecutorial immunity in 1926.69
Although the Imbler decision did not address whether
prosecutorial immunity was well established at common law when section 1983 was enacted in 1871,70 the decision is not without pre-1871
common law support.71 Indeed, as far back as 1606, private attorneys
were afforded absolute immunity when acting as advocates for their
clients in the judicial phase of a case.72 According to T. Leigh
Anenson:
Lawyers . . . are absolutely immune from civil liability for statements
or conduct that may have injured, offended, or otherwise damaged
an opposing party during the litigation process. This protection,
often referred to as the “litigation privilege,” shields a litigator regardless of malice, bad faith, or ill will of any kind. It originated at
the very beginning of English jurisprudence for the purpose of
district court granted the writ. Id. at 414. After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s ruling, the State dropped its appeals and Imbler was released. Id. at 415.
66
Id. at 431 (“We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”).
67
Id. at 421.
68
44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896).
69
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421–22 (citing Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam)).
70
See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“There was,
of course, no such thing as absolute prosecutorial immunity when § 1983 was enacted.
(Indeed, . . . there generally was no such thing as the modern public prosecutor.)”).
71
There are, however, many who have criticized the historical underpinnings of Imbler. See, e.g., Karen McDonald Henning, The Failed Legacy of Absolute Immunity Under Imbler:
Providing a Compromise Approach to Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 219,
221 (2013) (“[C]hanges in the legal landscape, as well as historical research, have cast
significant doubt on the continued validity of Imbler’s reasoning.”). In rebuttal to such
criticisms, however, it should be noted that in Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir.
1926), aff’d, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam), a decision upon which the Imbler Court
heavily relied, the Second Circuit analogized the function of a prosecutor in initiating a
prosecution to that of a grand juror. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509–10 (1978).
And according to the Second Circuit, grand jurors were entitled to absolute immunity at
common law. Yaselli, 12 F.2d at 403 (citing 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 349 (6th
ed. 1787)).
72
T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation Lawyers,
31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 919 (2004) (“The first opinion dismissing a lawsuit against an attorney
by applying the doctrine of absolute immunity was rendered in 1606.” (citing Brook v.
Montague, (1606) 79 Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B.) 77)).
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protecting the advocacy system and its participants, and it crossed
the Atlantic Ocean to reach the shores of America after
colonization.73

With an established common law tradition of protecting private
counsel, the Court reasonably extended absolute immunity to public
prosecutors who serve as the state’s counsel for their conduct during
trial, despite the fact that the role of public prosecutor was not widely
established in 1871.74 Just as no distinction existed between private
and public officials serving as witnesses in regard to their entitlement
of absolute witness immunity,75 there is no reason why public officials
who serve as advocates during the judicial phase of a proceeding
should not be entitled to the same absolute immunity that private attorneys were afforded at common law.76
As for whether quasi-judicial immunity accords with the purpose
of section 1983, the Imbler Court explained that prosecutors require
absolute immunity protections from civil suits for the same policy reasons as judges, such as the concerns about vexatious litigation and the
potential chilling effect on the prosecutor’s independent and unhesitating exercise of his duties.77 Additionally, potential plaintiffs are
protected from prosecutorial misconduct by the availability of collateral remedies to attack the fairness of the trial.78
It is important to note, however, that although the policy considerations regarding judicial and quasi-judicial immunity are similar, the
Imbler Court did not ground its opinion on the reasoning that a prosecutor derived immunity from the judge. Instead, the opinion looked
to the common law as an independent basis to support absolute
prosecutorial immunity.79 That is to say, rather than conclude that
the judge’s immunity transferred to the prosecutor (and to a witness),
prosecutors (and witnesses) are entitled to absolute immunity in their
own right.80
73
Id. at 916 (footnote omitted) (noting the “privilege” and “immunity” are interchangeable); see also Paul T. Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator’s Absolute Privilege to Defame,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 1017–18 (1993) (cataloguing early American cases citing English
courts for the rule that lawyers were absolutely immune from civil liability for words spoken
during trial).
74
Imbler, 424 U.S at 431; see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503–04 (2012)
(discussing the historical development of the role of the public prosecutor).
75
See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983).
76
See Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1504.
77
See 424 U.S. at 422–23 (“[I]f the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each
time such a person charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.”).
78
See id. at 422–27.
79
Id.
80
Id.
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B. The Functional Approach
The Court has noted that “ ‘the precise contours of official immunity’ need not mirror the immunity at common law.”81 Where the
common law as of 1871 may not have explicitly considered whether a
twenty-first century function deserved immunity, modern courts may
extend absolute immunity to a “new” function by drawing an analogy
to similar functions to which 1871 common law afforded absolute immunity.82 The Court, however, still “look[s] to the common law and
other history for guidance because [its] role is not to make a freewheeling policy choice, but rather to discern Congress’[s] likely intent
in enacting § 1983.”83 Thus, when an official claims absolute immunity for performing a function that did not yet exist in 1871, courts
must identify an analogous function that was entitled to absolute immunity at common law.84
To evaluate whether a claim of immunity is implicit in section
1983, courts employ a “functional approach.”85 This functional approach recognizes that immunity does not specifically cover the individual, but rather the immunity insulates her act from liability.86
Thus, a judge receives absolute judicial immunity for her judicial determinations made within the scope of her jurisdiction.87 However, a
judge is not absolutely immune when making administrative or executive decisions in the management of her chambers.88 For example, in
Forrester v. White, the Court rejected a judge’s claim that he was protected by absolute judicial immunity when making personnel decisions.89 In distinguishing between a judge’s administrative and
judicial functions, the Court recognized “an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive
81
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 645 (1987)).
82
See, e.g., Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1505 (extending immunity to public officials testifying
before a grand jury); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (affording immunity to
agency adjudicators); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 (granting immunity to public prosecutors).
83
Burns, 500 U.S. at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84
See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[O]ur original decisions recognizing defenses and immunities to suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
rely on analogous limitations existing in the common law when § 1983 was enacted.”); see
also Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1502 (“Recognizing that ‘Congress intended [§ 1983] to be construed in the light of common-law principles,’ the Court has looked to the common law for
guidance in determining the scope of the immunities available in a § 1983 action.” (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997))).
85
See Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1503.
86
Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 475 (“[A]bsolute immunity goes to the task, not to
the office.”); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (“[I]mmunity is justified
and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.”).
87
MECHEM, supra note 32, at 400.
88
See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229–30.
89
See id.

R
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functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.”90 A personnel decision is not adjudicative in nature and an
injured party lacks the “ordinary mechanisms of review” to correct a
judge’s mistakes.91 Therefore, administrative functions are not absolutely immune, even when performed by a judge.92
The functional approach not only limits absolute immunity for
officers generally entitled to immunity when performing acts that are
not covered by immunity, but it also works to confer immunity to officials not generally entitled to immunity when performing a function
that was historically deserving of immunity.93 For example, in Butz v.
Economou the Court extended absolute immunity to Department of
Agriculture officials involved in a licensing revocation proceeding on
the ground that these officials were performing judicial functions deserving of judicial immunity.94 Comparing the actions of agency adjudicators to those of judges, the Butz Court found that “adjudication
within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication should also be immune from suits for damages.”95 In
particular, “the safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling
unconstitutional conduct.”96
C. Limits on Absolute Immunity in Section 1983 Suits
The Supreme Court, however, has not been persuaded by arguments that an official deserves absolute immunity from section 1983
liability merely because the official performs a function integral to the
judicial process without also demonstrating a common law analogy.97
In Antoine, the Court resolved a circuit split over whether to extend
absolute immunity to court reporters.98 The plaintiff, Antoine, was
convicted of bank robbery after a two-day trial and promptly appealed.99 The court reporter, Ruggenberg, however, was unable to
produce a transcript for the appeal because she had lost her trial
90

Id. at 227.
See id. at 223, 227.
92
Id. at 227–30.
93
See Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 475 (“[P]rosecutors have absolute immunity, but
only for prosecutorial actions; judges have absolute immunity for their judicial acts, but not
for administrative acts; legislators have absolute immunity for their legislative functions,
but not for administrative tasks.”).
94
See 438 U.S. 478, 512–13 (1978).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 512.
97
See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993).
98
Id. at 432.
99
Id. at 430.
91

R
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notes.100 Eventually a transcript was produced with help from another
court reporter, but as a result of Ruggenberg’s mistake, Antoine’s appeal was not heard for four years.101 Antoine sued Ruggenberg and
her employer, Byers & Anderson, Inc., under section 1983.102
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in extending absolute judicial immunity to the function of court reporting, reasoned “the tasks
performed by a court reporter in furtherance of her statutory duties
are functionally part and parcel of the judicial process.”103 In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reasserted that in order
to determine whether a function is entitled to “a full exemption from
liability, we have undertaken a considered inquiry into the immunity
historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it.”104 It then noted that modern court reporters were
“unknown during the centuries when the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity developed,” and, thus, “not among the class of persons protected by judicial immunity in the 19th century.”105
However, the fact that an official was not among the class of protected officials at common law as of 1871 does not necessarily require
the court to reject the claim of absolute immunity.106 If the official
can demonstrate that her function is analogous to a function that was
absolutely immune at common law, then a court can extend absolute
immunity.107 The Antoine Court, however, rejected the court reporter’s argument that her professional function was analogous to
“common-law judges who made handwritten notes during trials.”108
According to the Court, the duties of a court reporter are not discretionary, but rather ministerial.109 As the Court previously held in Forrester v. White, “judges are not entitled to absolute immunity when
acting in their administrative capacity.”110 Thus, even if a court reporter’s duties were analogous to judicial note taking, the fact that the
court reporter exercised no discretion in performing the function
precluded an extension of judicial immunity because a judge would
100

Id.
Id. at 430–31. Antoine’s conviction was ultimately upheld. Id.
102
Id. at 431.
103
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 950 F.2d 1471, 1476 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d, 508
U.S. 429 (1993).
104
Antoine, 508 U.S. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
105
Id. at 433.
106
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512–13 (1978).
107
See id.
108
Antoine, 508 U.S. at 434 (“Faced with the absence of a common-law tradition involving court reporters themselves, respondents urge us to treat as their historical counterparts
common-law judges who made handwritten notes during trials. We find the analogy
unpersuasive.”).
109
Id. at 436.
110
Id. at 435 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)).
101
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not have been absolutely immune for performing such a nondiscretionary function.111
The Court then rejected the court reporter’s argument that the
“functional approach to immunity requires that absolute immunity be
extended to court reporters because they are ‘part of the judicial function.’ ”112 The Court thus rejected the theory that the judge’s immunity could transfer to the court reporter based on the fact that the
court reporter aided the judge.113 Rather, Justice Stevens asserted,
“the ‘touchstone’ for the doctrine’s applicability has been ‘performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.’ ”114 Thus, the functional
approach, according to the Antoine Court, does not extend immunity
to a function merely because that function may be “extremely important,” “indispensible to the appellate process,” or “essential to the very
functioning of the courts.”115 Instead, the functional approach only
extends judicial immunity to officials who “exercise the kind of judgment that is protected by the [common law] doctrine of judicial immunity.”116 The type of judgment protected by judicial immunity is
the discretion involved in “resolving disputes between parties, or of
authoritatively adjudicating private rights.”117
II
MISAPPLICATIONS

OF

SECTION 1983 ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
LOWER COURTS

IN THE

While the Supreme Court has been “quite sparing” in extending
absolute immunity,118 lower courts have regularly extended absolute
immunity beyond the categories recognized by the Supreme Court.119
In so doing, these courts have often employed a flawed analysis that
absolute immunity can transfer from an official who is entitled to immunity to auxiliary officials who assist the immune official in the performance of immune functions, even when the auxiliary official is
111

Id. at 437.
Id. at 435 (quoting Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 950 F.2d 1471, 1476 (9th Cir.
1991), rev’d, 508 U.S. 429 (1993)) (internal citation omitted).
113
See id.
114
Id. at 435–36 (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
115
See id., 508 U.S. at 436–37 (citations omitted).
116
Id. at 437.
117
See Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118
Id. at 487 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)).
119
See Johns, supra note 4, at 276, 280–83, 286–90, 301–10 (criticizing the extension of
absolute immunity to court appointees and adjuncts, such as mental-health experts and
social-service workers, and to decisionmakers in nonjudicial proceedings that lack procedural safeguards, such as parole-board members and licensing-board members).
112

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-4\CRN406.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 17

THE TRANSFERRED IMMUNITY TRAP

27-APR-15

12:53

1001

performing a different function altogether.120 These courts disregard
the need to look to the common law to determine if a function performed by the official was or would have been deserving of immunity
in 1871.121 Instead, these courts extend absolute immunity by employing a transferred immunity approach when the auxiliary official is
performing a function that is important to the functioning to the judicial system.122 Lower courts that employ this reasoning engage in the
freewheeling policy determinations that the Supreme Court has explicitly instructed courts not to make in the section 1983 context.123
A. Application in the Lower Courts
The root of many decisions extending absolute immunity on a
transferred basis to officials who perform functions important to the
judicial system is exemplified by opinions like the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Scruggs v. Moellering.124 In Scruggs, an inmate brought a
section 1983 suit against a judge and a court reporter for allegedly
falsifying his trial transcript.125 In extending absolute judicial immunity to the court reporter, Judge Posner declared that “[a]uxiliary judicial personnel who perform functions at once integral to the judicial
process and nonmechanical are entitled to absolute immunity from
damages liability for acts performed in the discharge of those functions, just as judges are.”126
Although the holding in Scruggs that court reporters are entitled
to absolute immunity was later rejected in Antoine,127 the Seventh
Circuit continued to apply the basic reasoning that auxiliary officers
could derive absolute immunity from a judge for acts that assist the
judge in the performance of her duties.128 In Trent v. Gordon, a plaintiff brought a section 1983 suit against a juvenile court clerk for
120

See discussion infra Part II.B.
See id.
122
See id.
123
See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986) (“We reemphasize that our role is to
interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy
choice, and that we are guided in interpreting Congress’ intent by the common-law
tradition.”).
124
870 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1989).
125
Id. at 377.
126
Id. Judge Posner emphasized that a court reporter’s function “is not a mechanical
process.” Id. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the notion that court reporting is a
discretionary act when it rejected the claim that court reporters are entitled to absolute
immunity. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (“[C]ourt reporters are required by statute to ‘recor[d] verbatim’ court proceedings in their entirety.
They are afforded no discretion in the carrying out of this duty; they are to record, as
accurately as possible, what transpires in court.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also supra notes 98–117 and accompanying text.
127
508 U.S. at 435–37 (rejecting the premise that a judge’s immunity could transfer to
a court reporter simply because the court reporter aided the judge).
128
See infra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
121

R

R
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allegedly conspiring to delay the filing of the plaintiff’s custody petition until after the court granted the state temporary custody of the
plaintiff’s grandchild.129 In upholding summary judgment in favor of
the court clerk on grounds of absolute judicial immunity, the Seventh
Circuit explained, “[a]lthough the act of filing a petition might be
characterized as more administrative than judicial in character, [the
court clerk] is nonetheless entitled to absolute judicial immunity because she acted under the explicit direction of the judge.”130
Other circuits have also subscribed to the reasoning that absolute
immunity can transfer from one official to another, even where the
subordinate official performs a different function than the immune
official does.131 Recently the Tenth Circuit extended absolute immunity to a special master in a state custody proceeding.132 The plaintiff,
Morkel, brought a section 1983 claim against the special master,
Dredge, for allegedly engaging in ex parte contacts, issuing orders
outside her jurisdiction, and preventing Morkel from seeing her
child.133 Specifically, the court held that the special master’s function
of “alter[ing] the parent-time schedule” was immune because the
judge assigned the function to Dredge.134 There was no discussion
about whether the function of setting a parent-time schedule was a
judicial act or if it was analogous to a function historically afforded
absolute immunity.135 Rather, the court reasoned, “non-judicial officers may be afforded the same absolute immunity enjoyed by judges
when a claim is based on duties performed in furtherance of the judicial process.”136
129

No. 99-3928, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11092, at *1–3 (7th Cir. May 11, 2000).
Id. at *6 (citing Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also Richman
v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The absolute immunity afforded to judges
has been extended to apply to . . . ‘[n]on-judicial officials whose official duties have an
integral relationship with the judicial process.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir. 1986))). Professor Nahmod has used the term “Nuremberg defense” to refer to the defense advanced by
officials acting at the direction of judicial officers, even where the judicial officer’s directive
is presumptively invalid. See Sheldon Nahmod, From the Courtroom to the Street: Court Orders
and Section 1983, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 613, 616, 633 (2002). The term alludes to the
war-crimes defense made post-WWII by some Nazi officers that they were merely acting at
the direction of superior officers and did not deserve punishment. See id. at 634 n.98.
131
See infra notes 132–141 and accompanying text.
132
See Morkel v. Davis, 513 F. App’x 724, 729 (10th Cir. 2013).
133
Id. at 726.
134
Id. at 729.
135
See id. (simply considering that the judge in the state custody proceeding appointed
Dredge as the special master).
136
Id. (citing Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000)). Employing the same reasoning, the Tenth Circuit has also extended absolute immunity to court
clerks for failure to notice an individual, leading to a default judgment against that individual, see Schrader v. New Mexico, 361 F. App’x 971, 974 (10th Cir. 2010), and to a bail bond
commissioner for failing to process a bail application in a timely manner, resulting in an
130
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This transferred immunity approach has also been particularly
prevalent in the extension of absolute immunity to officials executing
court orders. While the Supreme Court has yet to consider whether
the execution of a court order is a function deserving of absolute immunity in the context of section 1983 litigation,137 circuit courts have
consistently held that an official executing a court order is entitled to
absolute immunity from section 1983 liability.138 For example, in J.P.
Silverton Industries L.P. v. Sohm, the Sixth Circuit extended absolute
immunity to officials who executed a foreclosure sale.139 The court
noted that “[t]he execution of a foreclosure sale is . . . not an action
‘normally performed by a judge,’ or analogous ‘to a general function
normally performed by a judge.’ ”140 Nonetheless, the court afforded
the officials absolute immunity by reasoning “absolute quasi-judicial
immunity is unlike absolute judicial immunity in that it does not derive from the discretionary nature of an official’s actions. Rather, it
derives from the official’s lack of discretion.”141
Not only has the Supreme Court not endorsed the idea that
quasi-judicial immunity derives from a lack of discretion, but the Sixth
Circuit also did not point to any common law support for its position,
nor did it make an analogy to the recognized quasi-judicial functions
of advocacy, testimony, or factual adjudication.142 Rather, the Sixth
Circuit explained “absolute judicial immunity has been extended to
non-judicial officers who perform . . . tasks so integral or intertwined
with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the
judicial officer who is immune.”143
Other circuits have also extended absolute immunity on the basis
of transferred immunity to the “quasi-judicial” act of executing a court
individual spending an extra night in jail, see Hinton v. Franck, No. 00-1142, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33121, at *6–7 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000).
137
See Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme
Court also has not decided whether prison officials are entitled to absolute immunity from
§ 1983 liability for enforcing facially valid court orders.”).
138
See id. at 1039 (noting that “the courts of appeals that have addressed whether
prison officials are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for enforcing facially valid
court orders have uniformly concluded that they are” and citing cases that have so
concluded).
139
243 Fed. Appx. 82, 89 (6th Cir. 2007).
140
Id. (quoting Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2004)).
141
Id. (citing Whitesel, 222 F.3d at 869).
142
See id. ([B]ecause . . . [the official] was simply following an order of the court, he is
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.”).
143
Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, PC v. Banks, 716 F.3d 404, 412 (6th
Cir. 2013) (“Extension of such immunity to officials performing quasi-judicial duties has
been recognized for ‘those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the
judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is
immune.’” (quoting Bush, 38 F.3d at 847)).
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order.144 Most recently, in Engebretson v. Mahoney, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that extending absolute immunity to executive officers executing a court order “is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent
case law, because it is beyond dispute that prison officials enforcing
court orders are performing functions necessary to the judicial
process.”145
Outside of the context of executing court orders, many courts
have found that court clerks share the judge’s absolute immunity.146
The D.C. Circuit adopted absolute immunity for court clerks on the
ground that absolute judicial “immunity applies to all acts of auxiliary
court personnel that are basic and integral parts of the judicial function, unless those acts are done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”147 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit explicitly rejected the idea that a
function must be discretionary to be judicial in nature.148
144
For instance, in Valdez v. Denver the Tenth Circuit held that a sheriff and a prison
warden were entitled to absolute “quasi-judicial” immunity for incarcerating a prisoner
pursuant to a facially valid court order. See 878 F.2d 1285, 1289–90 (10th Cir. 1989). The
court “[r]ecogniz[ed] that the power to execute judicial decrees is no less an important
and integral part of the judicial process than the roles of those officials previously afforded
absolute immunity.” Id. at 1287–88. More recently, the Tenth Circuit extended absolute
immunity to two sheriff’s deputies who executed disputed court orders by reasoning that
“‘just as judges acting in their judicial capacity are absolutely immune from liability under
section 1983, officials charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoy
absolute immunity from liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct prescribed by
that order.’” Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1163 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Turney v.
O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1472 (10th Cir. 1990)). The First Circuit has noted that “a receiver who faithfully and carefully carries out the orders of his appointing judge must share
the judge’s absolute immunity. To deny him this immunity would seriously encroach on
the judicial immunity already recognized by the Supreme Court.” Kermit Constr. Corp. v.
Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has said “[t]he rationale for immunizing persons who execute court orders is apparent. Such persons are themselves integral parts of the judicial process.” Coverdell v. Dep’t
of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 765 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit, likewise, noted that “receivers . . . enjoy judicial immunity for
acts within the scope of their authority.” Prop. Mgmt. & Invs., Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599,
602 (11th Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit has also subscribed to the rationale that “where
the defendant is directly involved in the judicial process . . . he may be covered by the
immunity afforded the judge because he is performing a ministerial function at the direction of the judge.” Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 1975).
145
724 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., TORTS BRANCH REPRESENTATION MONOGRAPH
III: IMMUNITY OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN PERSONAL DAMAGES ACTIONS 5–6 (1985) (noting
the general consensus that “judicial immunity also may have a derivative application.
There is general agreement that clerks of a court are absolutely immune when they perform a ministerial function at the direction of a judge.”).
147
Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Jackson v. Houck, 181 F. App’x 372, 373 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(“[L]aw clerks . . . are also entitled to absolute judicial immunity when assisting the judge
in carrying out the former’s judicial functions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
148
See Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1461 (“[W]e agree with the Sixth Circuit that ‘[w]hether an
act is judicial in character does not depend on whether it is discretionary.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988))). But see Antoine v.
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The Second Circuit extended absolute judicial immunity to court
clerks who allegedly wrongfully refused a plaintiff’s document request
and failed to properly manage the court calendar.149 In Rodriguez v.
Weprin the Second Circuit determined that if the clerks’ functions deserved absolute judicial immunity, it was irrelevant whether the functions were discretionary or ministerial.150 Judicial immunity,
according to the Second Circuit, “extends to law clerks where they are
assisting judges performing judicial functions.”151
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit extended absolute judicial immunity
from section 1983 liability to a court clerk for refusing to file a plaintiff’s complaint.152 The court cited its reasoning from an earlier nonsection 1983 case,153 which explained: “In the context of judicial immunity from claims for damages, when a court clerk assists a court or
a judge in the discharge of judicial functions, the clerk is considered
the functional equivalent of the judge and enjoys derivative
immunity.”154
In addition to absolute judicial immunity, courts have found that
other types of immunity are transferable to auxiliary officers. In a section 1983 suit, the Third Circuit extended absolute prosecutorial immunity to a nonattorney prosecutor’s office employee.155 The
plaintiff alleged that the employee conspired to withhold exculpatory
evidence by mailing a discovery packet to the plaintiff’s attorney
without including the exculpatory evidence.156 In extending absolute
Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (“When judicial immunity is extended to
officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are ‘functionally comparable’ to
those of judges—that is, because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as a part of
their function.” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976))).
149
Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997).
150
See id. at 67 (“[E]ven if viewed as performing an administrative task, the court
clerks are entitled to immunity for harms allegedly related to the delay in scheduling appellant’s appeal.”).
151
Id. In a non-section 1983 case, the Ninth Circuit relied on Rodriguez to extend
absolute immunity to a bankruptcy trustee for miscalendaring and failing to give notice to
the plaintiff in a bankruptcy proceeding. In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Ninth Circuit noted that it had “extended absolute quasi-judicial immunity in
post-Antoine decisions to court clerks and other non-judicial officers for purely administrative acts.” Id. The court explained, “[t]he judge’s clerk was also immune from suit because . . . ‘[t]he concern for the integrity of the judicial process that underlies the absolute
immunity of judges is reflected in the extension of absolute immunity to certain others
who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process.’” Id. (quoting Moore v.
Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996)).
152
Spalsbury v. Sisson, 250 F. App’x 238, 248 (10th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff attempted
to file a complaint against his ex-wife for alleged false imprisonment during a custody
argument. Id. at 242.
153
Id. at 248.
154
Trackwell v. United States, 472 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
155
See Moore v. Middlesex Cnty. Prosecutors Office, 503 F. App’x 108, 109 (3d Cir.
2012) (per curiam).
156
Id.
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immunity, the court explained that “[t]he employee of an attorney,
including the employee or agent of a prosecutor, is also granted absolute immunity from § 1983 suits where the function of the employee
and the judicial process are closely allied.”157 In fact, the Third
Circuit noted it had previously held “that absolute immunity extends
to employees of prosecutors who perform investigative work in furtherance of a criminal prosecution,”158 despite the fact that the Supreme Court has held that prosecutors, themselves, are not immune
for their investigatory functions.159
B. The Fallacy of Transferred Immunity
The lower courts’ extension of absolute judicial immunity on the
basis of transferred immunity to functions that merely “ ‘have an integral relationship with the judicial process’ ”160 misconstrues the
Supreme Court’s functional approach to section 1983 immunities. In
its most recent application of the functional approach, the Supreme
Court explained that it “consult[s] the common law to identify those
governmental functions that were historically viewed as so important
and vulnerable to interference by means of litigation that some form
of absolute immunity from civil liability was needed . . . .”161 Modern
courts cannot extend absolute immunity to functions not protected at
common law by “simply mak[ing] [their] own judgment about the
need for immunity.”162 This is because courts “do not have a license
to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests of what
[courts] judge to be sound public policy.”163 Because courts engage
in statutory interpretation when implying section 1983 immunities, to
base immunities on policy rather than history essentially rewrites the
statute.164
Supreme Court precedent does not support the extension of absolute immunity to auxiliary officials on the grounds that their
157

Id.
Id. (citing Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 631–32 (3d Cir. 1993)).
159
See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (“We do not believe, however, that [a
prosecutor] advising the police in the investigative phase of a criminal case . . . qualifies for
absolute immunity.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Prosecutorial Immunity, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1643,
1644 (1999) (“Prosecutors have absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts, but not for investigative, and not for administrative acts.”).
160
Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Henry v. Farmer
City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d
1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[I]mmunity applies to all acts of auxiliary court personnel
that are basic and integral parts of the judicial function.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
161
Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012).
162
Id. at 1502.
163
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493–94 (1991) (quoting Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S.
914, 922–23 (1984)).
164
Id. at 493–94.
158
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functions aid an official who is entitled to absolute immunity.165 Indeed, as far back as 1821, the Supreme Court recognized that while
legislators and judges were immune for their official conduct, their
immunity did not transfer to other officers.166
In the context of legislative immunity, it is well established that
while a legislator has immunity for acts performed within his legislative function, those called upon to carry out the acts do not share his
immunity.167 As Professor Woolhandler points out, “[legislative] immunity covers the legislator in ordering, but not executing.”168 In Kilbourn v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held that although members of
the House of Representatives were entitled to legislative immunity for
ordering the arrest and imprisonment of an individual who refused to
appear before a House committee, the sergeant-at-arms, who was
tasked with carrying out the order, was not absolutely immune from
liability.169 In justifying its decision, the Court referred to an earlier
case, Kielley v. Carson & Others, which held that “the order of the assembly, finding the plaintiff guilty of a contempt, was no defence to
the action for imprisonment.”170
165
See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 233–34 (1821) (“In reply to the suggestion
that, on this same foundation of necessity, might be raised a superstructure of implied
powers in the executive, and every other department, and even ministerial officer of the
government, it would be sufficient to observe, that neither analogy nor precedent would
support the assertion of such powers in any other than a legislative or judicial body.”).
166
See id.
167
See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) (“This Court has held, however,
that [legislative immunity] is less absolute . . . when applied to officers or employees of a
legislative body, rather than to legislators themselves.”).
168
Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 396, 403 (1987); see also id. at 404–05 (“The legislator is thus privileged to inflict
harms by speech, and to direct a limited set of trespasses, but not physically to commit
any . . . .”).
169
103 U.S. 168, 203–05 (1881) (citing Kielley v. Carson and others (1842), 13 Eng.
Rep. 225 (P.C.) appeal taken from Nfld. L.R.).
170
Id. at 199. In Gravel v. United States, the Supreme Court held that legislative aides
were entitled to absolute legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions. 408
U.S. 606, 616–17 (1972). This extension of absolute legislative immunity is consistent with
the functional approach in that the function, not the official, is protected by immunity. See
id. at 613–22; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 475 (“[A]bsolute immunity goes to the
task, not to the office”). In Gravel, the Court noted that there are times when legislative
aides are required to stand in for the legislator. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616–17. Specifically,
the Court held that a Senator’s aides were absolutely immune for their role in convening a
hearing on the classified Pentagon Papers because this function is protected by the Speech
and Debate Clause. Id. at 626–27. Gravel is consistent with the argument that immunity
cannot transfer to a different function, but rather, immunity only covers functions that
previously were entitled to immunity. See id. Moreover, the argument that immunity does
not transfer between individuals themselves is supported in the context of Presidential
Immunity. In the companion cases of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), and Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme Court granted absolute immunity to the
President for decisions made while in office, but only qualified immunity for presidential
aides. See, e.g., Nixon, 457 U.S. at 756 (holding that the President “is entitled to absolute
immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts” and that immunity is “a

R
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Similarly, in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., the Virginia Supreme Court was responsible for
promulgating, enforcing, and adjudicating the state’s Bar Code.171
When the Consumers Union brought a section 1983 suit against the
Virginia Supreme Court and the Virginia Bar Association for “unconstitutionally restrict[ing] the right . . . to receive and gather nonfee
information and information concerning initial consultation fees,”172
the Virginia Supreme Court asserted absolute judicial and absolute
legislative immunity.173 The Court held that the act of promulgating
the Bar Code was a legislative function deserving of absolute legislative immunity,174 but the Virginia Supreme Court was not immune for
enforcing it.175 Thus, while the Virginia Supreme Court was absolutely
immune for promulgating rules, that immunity did not transfer to the
justices in their role as enforcement officials.176
It is not only in the context of legislative immunity that the Court
has rejected the theory of transferred immunity. Indeed, the Antoine
Court rejected such a theory when it denied absolute judicial immunity to a court reporter, despite the importance and indispensability
of court reporting to the judicial process.177 As the Court explained,
“[n]or is it sufficient that the task of a court reporter is extremely
important or . . . indispensible to the appellate process” in determining whether to extend absolute immunity to a nonjudicial officer aiding the judge in her judicial function.178 Rather, “[w]hen judicial
immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their
judgments are functionally comparable to those of judges.”179
In Dennis v. Sparks, the Court considered whether a section 1983
suit could be maintained against private individuals for allegedly conspiring with a judge to obtain an injunction, even though the judge
had been relieved of liability on the basis of absolute judicial
functionally mandated incident of the President’s unique office”); Harlow, 457 U.S. at
808–09 (recognizing “the importance to the President of loyal and efficient subordinates”
but finding “these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify absolute immunity”).
171
446 U.S. 719, 721–22 (1980).
172
Id. at 727.
173
Id. at 728.
174
Id. at 734 (“[T]he Virginia Court is exercising the State’s entire legislative power
with respect to regulating the Bar, and its members are the State’s legislators for the purpose of issuing the Bar Code. Thus the Virginia Court and its members are immune from
suit when acting in their legislative capacity.”).
175
Id. at 736 (“[W]e believe that the Virginia Court and its chief justice properly were
held liable in their enforcement capacities.”).
176
See id. at 734, 736.
177
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436–37 (1993); see also supra note
116 and accompanying text.
178
Id. at 436–37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
179
Id. at 436 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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immunity.180 The alleged conspirator, a private individual, “insist[ed]
that unless he [was] held to have an immunity derived from that of
the judge, the [judge’s] official immunity [would] be seriously
eroded.”181 In rejecting this argument, the Court first noted that
“[t]he immunities of state officials that we have recognized for the
purposes of § 1983 are the equivalents of those that were recognized
at common law.”182 Because conspiring with a judge is not a judicial
act deserving of absolute judicial immunity, the conspirator’s alleged
conduct was not functionally comparable to a judicial act.183 Mindful
that trying the case against the alleged conspirator could expose the
judge’s conduct to scrutiny and could require him to testify at trial,
the Court still was not persuaded of the need to transfer the judge’s
absolute immunity from civil liability to the alleged conspirator.184
The Court reasoned, “the potential harm to the public from denying
immunity to private co-conspirators is outweighed by the benefits of
providing a remedy against those private persons who participate in
subverting the judicial process and in so doing inflict injury on other
persons.”185
Just as a private individual conspiring with a judge to use the judicial process to deprive another person of his constitutional or statutory rights does not receive the judge’s judicial immunity, public
officials, such as court clerks, who deprive a person of his constitutional or statutory rights should not receive the judge’s immunity without a showing that the auxiliary official’s function itself deserves
absolute immunity. Unfortunately, in contrast to cases like Antoine
and Dennis v. Sparks, lower courts have granted immunity without this
showing when they cloak judicial assistants with the judge’s immunity,
even when those auxiliary officials perform nonimmune functions.
Instead, courts simply transfer the judge’s immunity to the auxiliary
official.
Without a common law basis to support a theory that immunity
can transfer between individuals, courts are required to inquire
whether a common law basis exists for insulating with absolute immunity those functions performed by auxiliary officials.186 Despite this,
lower courts have held that executive officials are entitled to absolute
180

See 449 U.S. 24, 25–26 (1980).
Id. at 29.
182
Id. (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637–38 (1980); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
183
Id. at 31.
184
Id. at 30–32.
185
Id. at 31–32.
186
See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 497 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“While we have not thought a common-law tradition (as of 1871) to be a
sufficient condition for absolute immunity under § 1983, we have thought it to be a necessary
one . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
181
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immunity for executing court orders;187 a special master is entitled to
absolute immunity for setting custody schedules;188 and court clerks
are entitled to absolute immunity for delaying or refusing to file a
complaint or petition,189 managing court calendars,190 and deciding
whether to issue documents to litigants,191 merely because these officials assist the judge in the performance of judicial duties.192 These
acts, however, are not incident to “resolving disputes between parties,
or . . . authoritatively adjudicating private rights,”193 which constitutes
“the kind of judgment that is protected by the doctrine of judicial
immunity.”194 Nor are these acts the type of quasi-judicial functions
that are entitled to absolute immunity (i.e., testimony, advocacy, and
factual adjudication).195
This is not to suggest that no common law tradition of absolute
immunity exists for any of these functions.196 However, courts that
simply transfer immunity to auxiliary officials who aid immune offi187
See, e.g., Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Prison
officials who simply enforce facially valid court orders are performing functions necessary
to the judicial process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
188
See, e.g., Morkel v. Davis, 513 F. App’x 724, 729 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[N]on-judicial
officers [i.e., special masters] may be afforded the same absolute immunity enjoyed by
judges when a claim is based on duties performed in furtherance of the judicial process.”).
189
See, e.g., Spalsbury v. Sisson, 250 F. App’x 238, 248 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]his immunity also extends to . . . the court clerk, [who] is accused of no more than assisting . . . in
the discharge of . . . judicial functions.”); Trent v. Gordon, No. 99-3928, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11092, at *5 (7th Cir. May 11, 2000) (“Although the act of filing a petition might be
characterized as more administrative than judicial in character, [a court clerk] is nonetheless entitled to absolute judicial immunity because [the action was] under the explicit direction of the judge.”); Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The clerk of
court and deputy clerks are the officials through whom such filing is done. Consequently,
the clerks qualify for quasi-judicial immunity . . . .”). The Seventh Circuit has more recently held that the refusal of a court clerk to file a complaint is not a function that enjoys
absolute judicial immunity when the refusal was not made at the direction of the judge. See
Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 287–89 (7th Cir. 2004).
190
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A court’s inherent
power to control its docket is part of its function . . . for which the judges and their supporting staff are afforded absolute immunity.”).
191
See, e.g., id.
192
See, e.g., Spalsbury, 250 F. App’x at 248 (holding that derivative immunity applies
when the official’s function directly assists the judge in the performance of judicial duties).
193
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 437 (1993).
195
See discussion supra Part I.A.3. Similarly, lower courts have held that an employee
in a prosecutor’s office is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for conspiring to
withhold evidence during the judicial phase of the proceeding, regardless of whether such
conduct is an advocacy function. See Moore v. Middlesex Cnty. Prosecutors Office, 503 F.
App’x 108, 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also supra notes 155–59 and accompanying
text.
196
Indeed, there is some support that the execution of a court order deserves of its
own category of absolute immunity. For instance, in Erskine v. Hohnbach, the Supreme
Court held that a ministerial officer could not be liable for enforcing a tax assessment. 81
U.S. 613, 616 (1871). The Court noted:

R
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cials fail to properly analyze whether the function performed by the
auxiliary officials is, itself, deserving of absolute immunity.197 It may
well be the case that there is a common law tradition of insulating
judges for calendaring hearings or deciding whether and when a complaint should be filed. But it also may be the case that such functions
are administrative in nature and a judge would not have been absolutely immune for performing such functions at common law.198 By
failing to engage in a common law analysis, courts that adhere to the
transferred immunity theory not only misconstrue the functional approach but also risk undermining section 1983 by unnecessarily limiting the ability of aggrieved plaintiffs to recover civil damages for
violations of their constitutional rights.199

THE REASON

III
LOWER COURTS’ MISAPPLICATION
SECTION 1983 IMMUNITIES

FOR

OF

The error that many lower courts make may be attributed to the
fact that the Supreme Court’s own reasoning in regard to section 1983
immunities has not always been entirely clear.200 Professor
Achtenberg has argued that the Court has employed five distinct approaches to the section 1983 immunity doctrine.201 According to
Achtenberg, “[d]espite the issue’s importance, and despite more than
two dozen decisions, the Supreme Court has been unable to create a
Whatever may have been the conflict at one time . . . as to the extent of
protection afforded to ministerial officers acting in obedience to process . . . it is well settled now, that if the officer or tribunal possess jurisdiction over the subject-matter upon which judgment is passed, with power to
issue an order or process for the enforcement of such judgment, and the
order or process issued thereon to the ministerial officer is regular on its
face . . . then, . . . the order or process will give full and entire protection to
the ministerial officer in its regular enforcement . . . .
Id. If absolute immunity for officials executing court orders was well established in 1871
(Erskine was decided in December 1871), then courts applying absolute immunity from
section 1983 liability to such officials should ground their decisions in this common-law
history and justify that the purpose behind the common-law rule accords with the purpose
of section 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
Rather than classify the immunity of officials executing court orders as a species of judicial
or quasi-judicial immunity, courts should employ the functional analysis and recognize that
the execution of a court order is independently immune.
197
In so doing, lower courts ignore the Supreme Court’s functional approach. See,
e.g., Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994).
198
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 492 (Souter, J., concurring).
199
See, e.g., Johns, supra note 4, at 267.
200
See Jeffries, Jr., supra note 16, at 208 (“[T]he fact remains that constitutional tort
doctrine is incoherent. It is so shot through with inconsistency and contradiction as to
obscure almost beyond recognition the underlying stratum of good sense.”).
201
David Achtenberg, Legal Theory: Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 499 (1992).

R
R
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stable body of immunity law.”202 More recently, after the Court issued
its Rehberg v. Paulk opinion, one commenter noted Justice Alito’s candidness “about the Court’s sometimes seemingly inconsistent approach to absolute immunity.”203
Indeed, the discussions in both Imbler v. Pachtman and Briscoe v.
LaHue seem to offer some support for the theory that immunity can
transfer from the immune official to another official assisting the immune official in the performance of her duties.204 In Imbler, Justice
Powell wrote, “courts sometimes have described the prosecutor’s immunity as a form of ‘quasi-judicial immunity’ and referred to it as derivative of the immunity of judges.”205 Although Justice Powell’s
decision goes on to support prosecutorial immunity on common law
grounds,206 the suggestion that prosecutorial immunity was a type of
derivative judicial immunity has led lower courts to extend absolute
immunity to nonjudicial officers merely because those officials play a
role in the judicial process, regardless of whether the function performed by the official is analogous to a function that was entitled to
absolute immunity at common law.207
The error that courts seem to make when construing Imbler is mistaking the policy rationale underlying prosecutorial immunity for the
reason for recognizing prosecutorial immunity in the context of section 1983. Assisting a judge in making an accurate judicial determination is policy that supports prosecutorial immunity, but ultimately
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for
their decisions during the judicial phase of a case because in 1871 an
established common law tradition of insulating advocates participating in the judicial phase of a trial existed.208
Likewise, in Briscoe the Supreme Court asserted, “the common
law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for
all persons—governmental or otherwise—who were integral parts of
202
Id. at 498. Achtenberg is not alone in his criticism. A decade earlier, Theodore
Eisenberg noted “[s]erious problems still exist . . . both with the Court’s individual immunity decisions in the aggregate and with particular decisions.” Theodore Eisenberg, Section
1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 488 (1982).
203
Timothy Coates, Opinion Analysis: Absolute Immunity for Grand Jury Witnesses, SCO
TUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2012, 11:41 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/04/opinion-analy
sis-absolute-immunity-for-grand-jury-witnesses/.
204
See discussion supra notes 59–69.
205
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976).
206
Albeit without pointing to any pre-1871 case law recognizing attorneys’ absolute
immunity from civil liability for their conduct during the judicial phase of a proceeding.
See id. But see discussion supra at notes 69–73 (noting that at least as early as 1606, attorneys
were afforded absolute immunity when acting as advocates for their clients in the judicial
phase of a case).
207
See discussion supra notes 139–45.
208
See discussion supra notes 66–74.

R

R
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the judicial process.”209 This broad assertion of the common law basis
for absolute judicial immunity has also served as the basis for the extension of absolute immunity in many cases.210 However, not only did
the Briscoe Court ultimately engage in an in-depth discussion of the
common law witness immunity to support its decision,211 but additionally, the Court’s decision in Antoine later clarified that an individual is
not entitled to absolute immunity from section 1983 liability merely
because he is integral to the judicial process.212
CONCLUSION
By asserting that absolute immunity transfers from a judge to an
official who is instrumental in some aspect of the judicial process—
such as a court clerk managing a court calendar, an executive official
executing a court order, or an employee in a prosecutor’s office deciding to share evidence—courts fail to engage in the common law
inquiry the Supreme Court’s section 1983 immunity framework demands.213 In effect, courts are making “freewheeling policy”214 determinations about whether to afford absolute immunity to officials and
functions. In so doing, lower courts misapply the Supreme Court’s
section 1983 immunity framework. Moreover, decisions that subscribe
to a theory of transferred immunity risk rewriting section 1983 by importing new categories of absolute immunity that the 42d Congress
would not have intended.215 Finally, broadening the field of immunities deprives potential plaintiffs of a potent civil remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights.216
Lower courts should pay close attention to the Supreme Court’s
framework, particularly to the need to support extensions of absolute
immunity with common law analogies.217 The reason for doing so
goes beyond a formalist desire to properly interpret the statutory intent of the 42d Congress. Constraining the expansion of absolute immunities recognized in section 1983 will contribute to the underlying
purpose of this important Civil Rights statute: to prevent deprivations
209

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983).
See, e.g., Valdez v. Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 1989).
211
See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330–31.
212
See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435–37 (1993); see also Snyder
v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 286–87 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Absolute immunity does not extend to all
positions simply ‘because they are part of the judicial function.’” (quoting Antoine, 508 U.S.
at 435)).
213
See, e.g., Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994); see also supra Part II.B.
214
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986).
215
See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
216
See Johns, supra note 4, at 267.
217
See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1505 (2012).
210
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of constitutional liberties by government officials acting under the
color of state law.218
By understanding the flaw that many courts make when applying
absolute immunity in the context of section 1983, future courts will be
better positioned to make analytically correct decisions. When courts
understand that they must support their decisions to extend absolute
immunity by analogizing to functions that were entitled to absolute
immunity at common law in 1871, reviewing courts can test the efficacy and accuracy of the common law analogy. For example, absolute
immunity for executing court orders may have been sufficiently prevalent at common law in 1871 to support the implicit adoption of absolute immunity for the execution of court orders in section 1983.219
However, courts need to test this history, rather than simply assert that
the immunity of the judge transfer to the executive official called
upon to execute the judicial will.
If, however, courts continue to analyze cases on the basis of transferred immunity, they will incorrectly continue to expand the category
of functions that are absolutely immune from section 1983 liability.
Erroneous decisions will continue to serve as precedent on which section 1983 continues to be slowly eroded by an ever-creeping regime of
implicit immunities.

218
219

See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
See discussion supra note 137.
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